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THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
Mahmud Jamal*
Brian Morgan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Solicitor-client privilege has been part of the common law for over 400
years, yet it has undergone its most profound transformation in just the last two
Supreme Court terms. In 2001, the Court declared the privilege to be a principle
of fundamental justice protected under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,1 and in 2002 added that a client also has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in communications with a lawyer that is guaranteed under
section 8.2
This paper traces the constitutionalization of the privilege, from its origins in
the law of evidence, to its status as a substantive principle and a fundamental
civil and legal right, to its most recent elevation to a constitutionally guaranteed
right under the Charter. We also discuss some of the important implications
flowing from constitutionalization. These include the potentially significant
impact of the privilege’s new status in the civil context, and whether the civil
bar should now be poised for a “full answer and defence” exception to the
privilege similar to that already recognized in the criminal context. We also
consider whether other legal privileges have similarly been constitutionalized,

* Partners, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP. We would like to thank Neil Paris, student-atlaw, for his excellent research assistance, and Jean-Marc Leclerc and Vaso Maric for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11; see R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 321.
2
Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v.
Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, 2002 SCC 61, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
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focussing on the established litigation privilege protecting a lawyer’s brief from
disclosure in the litigation process. Finally, we assess the impact of
constitutionalization on the law of waiver of privilege.

II. HOW SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAS
CONSTITUTIONALIZED
1. Solosky and Descôteaux: Laying the Groundwork
The modern Canadian law of solicitor-client privilege dates from the
Supreme Court’s 1979 ruling in Solosky v. The Queen,3 which considered
whether the privilege prevented prison authorities from opening an inmate’s
correspondence with his lawyer. Justice Dickson (as he then was) for the Court
stated that solicitor-client privilege “has long been recognized as fundamental
to the due administration of justice.”4 He traced the history of the privilege to
the 16th century with its origins in the “oath and honour” of a lawyer to closely
guard the secrets of his client, but noted that it originally operated only as an
exemption from testimonial compulsion. 5 In other words, solicitor-client
privilege was at first just a rule of evidence, preventing a lawyer from testifying
about communications with his or her client.
Justice Dickson noted how the privilege was gradually extended to include
communications exchanged during other litigation, those made in
contemplation of litigation, and finally to any consultation for legal advice,
whether litigious or not. He identified its rationale as being the complexity of
the law and the need to permit a client to speak candidly with his or her lawyer
to defend their interests, without fear that the privileged communication would
later be disclosed without the client’s consent. 6
Justice Dickson observed that recent case law had “taken the traditional
doctrine of privilege and placed it on a new plane.” It was “no longer regarded
merely as a rule of evidence which acts as a shield to prevent privileged
materials from being tendered in evidence in a court-room.” Recent decisions
had “shifted the time at which the privilege can be asserted.” But Dickson J.
nevertheless stopped short of recognizing the privilege as a rule of property,
ruling that the inmate could not invoke the evidentiary privilege because the
prison authorities did not purport to introduce his correspondence with his

3

[1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 495.
Id., at 833 (emphasis added). Justice Estey (at 842-43) concurred with Dickson J. but added brief concurring comments.
5
Id., at 834.
6
Id., at 834-35.
4
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solicitor into evidence in any legal proceeding. 7 Thus, while the rule of
evidence was now applied more flexibly, it still required some nexus with a
legal proceeding.
While the inmate could not invoke the evidentiary privilege, Dickson J.
concluded that a broader, substantive principle of privilege could be invoked.
He described this principle as based in the nature of solicitor-client privilege as
a “fundamental civil and legal right” and on the “right to privacy in solicitorclient correspondence,” saying this:
One may depart from the current concept of privilege and approach the case on the
broader basis that (i) the right to communicate in confidence with one’s legal
advisor is a fundamental civil and legal right, and (ii) a person confined to prison
retains all of his civil rights, other than those expressly or impliedly taken from him
by law. […]
The right to privacy in solicitor-client correspondence has not been expressly taken
away by the language of the Regulations and the Directive. 8

Justice Dickson stated that while the public interest in maintaining the safety
and security of the institution trumped the inmate’s solicitor-client privilege,
the interference with that privilege was to be “no greater than is essential to the
maintenance of security and the rehabilitation of the inmate.” 9 He therefore set
out guidelines for how the prison authorities could examine the inmate’s mail
in order to intrude on the privilege as little as possible, noting that, where
examined mail contained nothing in breach of security, the prison authorities
would be “under a duty at law to maintain the confidentiality of the
communication.”10
Less than three years after Solosky, the Court in Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski11
confirmed that solicitor-client privilege had indeed evolved from an evidentiary
to a substantive rule. At issue was whether the police could be lawfully
authorized by a search warrant to search a legal aid bureau and seize the form

7

Id., at 837-38:
Without the evidentiary connection, which the law now requires, the appellant cannot
invoke the privilege […] The complication in this case flows from the unique position of
the inmate. His mail is opened and read, not with a view to its use in a proceeding, but by
reason of the exigencies of institutional security. All of this occurs within the prison walls
and far from a court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is difficult to see how the privilege has
been engaged, unless one wishes totally to transform the privilege into a rule of property,
bereft of an evidentiary basis.
8
Id., at 839-40 (emphasis added).
9
Id., at 840.
10
Id., at 841-42.
11
[1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, 70 C.C.C. (2d) 385.
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filled out by a legal aid applicant, for the purpose of showing that the applicant
had lied about his financial means.12
Justice Lamer (as he then was) for the Court affirmed Solosky’s statement
that the right to communicate in confidence with one’s legal advisor was a
“fundamental civil and legal right,” which he characterized as “a personal and
extra-patrimonial right which follows a citizen throughout his dealings with
others.”13 He noted that in Solosky, Dickson J. had applied a standard that had
nothing to do with the privilege as a rule of evidence, since there was never any
question of testimony before a court or tribunal. Instead he had applied a
substantive rule without actually formulating it. Justice Lamer noted that the
substantive rule was based on the “fundamental right of a lawyer’s client to
have his communications kept confidential.” He formulated the substantive rule
that Dickson J. had applied as follows:
1.

The confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client may be
raised in any circumstances where such communications are likely to be
disclosed without the client’s consent.

2.

Unless the law provides otherwise, when and to the extent that the
legitimate exercise of a right would interfere with another person’s right to
have his communications with his lawyer kept confidential, the resulting
conflict should be resolved in favour of protecting the confidentiality.

3.

When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the
circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the
decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority
should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the
extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the
enabling legislation.

4.

Acts providing otherwise in situations under para. 2 and enabling
legislation referred to in para. 3 must be interpreted restrictively.14

Justice Lamer’s formulation remains the basic common law framework for
assessing claims of solicitor-client privilege. In the next 20 years, there were
nevertheless several other Supreme Court rulings touching upon the privilege,
establishing that it may be set aside to determine the validity of a trust
12
In the result, the Court found that these communications were not privileged as they fell
within a recognized “criminal communications” exception to the privilege that excludes communications that are criminal in themselves or made with a view to obtaining legal advice to facilitate
the commission of a crime (id., at 892-94).
13
Id., at 871. Justice Lamer stated that the substantive rule of privilege was based on “the
need to protect the fundamental right of a lawyer’s client to have his communications kept confidential” (at 888).
14
Id., at 875.
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agreement after the death of the settlor;15 drawing the distinction between
solicitor-client privilege as a class privilege and case-by-case privileges;16 and
recognizing that the privilege could be overridden to permit an accused to make
full answer and defence to a criminal charge. 17 Important as these rulings are,
they ultimately remain rooted in a common law paradigm, falling short of a
constitutional basis rooted in the Charter. This is essentially where the law
remained until 1999.
Some inkling of the future could nevertheless have been gleaned as early as
1992 from the first edition of Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of
Evidence in Canada, where solicitor-client privilege was identified as being
implicit in the right of an accused to instruct counsel under section 10(b) of the
Charter and part of the principles of fundamental justice under section 7. As
these authors presciently observed:
It has been held that if the solicitor-client privilege is to be abrogated by legislation,
it must be done in clear and unambiguous terms. However, s. 10(b) of the Charter
may put the protection of the solicitor-client privilege which is implicit in any right
of an accused to instruct counsel completely beyond the reach of Parliament or the
provincial legislatures. The privilege may also be part of the guarantee against
deprivation of liberty or security of the person except in accordance with
fundamental justice as set out in s. 7 of the Charter and thus may be immune from
any legislation that would have the effect of undermining it.18

2. Smith v. Jones: A Hint of Things to Come
In 1999 the Court took an important step towards constitutionalizing
solicitor-client privilege in Smith v. Jones.19 At issue was whether the privilege
15

Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353, at 387, per Wilson J.
R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 286, per Lamer C.J.
17
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 607, per McLachlin J. (as she then was) for the
majority (“solicitor-client privilege may yield to the accused’s right to defend himself on a criminal
charge”); R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 340, per Sopinka J. (“The trial judge might
also, in certain circumstances, conclude that the recognition of an existing privilege does not
constitute a reasonable limit on the constitutional right to make full answer and defence and thus
require disclosure in spite of the law of privilege”); and A.(L.L.) v. B.(A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, at
para. 69, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. On the full answer and defence exception to solicitor-client
privilege, see also R. v. Dunbar and Logan (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13, at 43-45 (Ont. C.A.), per
Martin J.A.; and David Layton, “Third Party Production, Legal-Professional Privilege and Full
Answer and Defence” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L.R. 277.
18
John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Butterworths, 1st ed. 1992), at 672 (footnotes omitted).
19
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 455. For commentary, see Adam M. Dodek, “The Public Safety Exception
to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293; David Layton, “The
16
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could be set aside in the interests of public safety, in this case, to protect the
public from a sex offender who had pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault
on a prostitute and had confided to a psychiatrist his plans to kill many more.
The accused’s counsel had referred him to the psychiatrist for a forensic
assessment, anticipating that it might assist in defending the charge or in
sentencing submissions. The accused’s counsel had advised him that the
consultation with the psychiatrist would be solicitor-client privileged. During
the consultation the accused confessed to the crime and explained that he had
intended to kill the prostitute, and that he planned to seek out similar victims in
the future. The psychiatrist informed the accused’s counsel of his opinion that
the accused was a dangerous individual who would, more likely than not,
commit similar offences unless he received treatment. After the accused
pleaded guilty, the psychiatrist called the accused’s counsel to inquire about the
proceedings, and was advised that the sentencing judge would not be told about
his concerns. Shortly thereafter, the psychiatrist commenced an action seeking
permission to be released from his duties of confidentiality.20
Justice Cory for the majority ruled that solicitor-client privilege could be set
aside in the interests of public safety, but only where the facts raised real
concerns that an identifiable individual or group is in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily harm. He cautioned that disclosure should be limited to
information necessary to protect public safety. 21
Justice Cory variously described the privilege as “fundamentally important
to our judicial system,”22 “both integral and extremely important to the
functioning of the legal system,”23 a “principle of fundamental importance to
the administration of justice,”24 with “deep significance in almost every
situation where legal advice is sought whether it be with regard to corporate
and commercial transactions, to family relationships, to civil litigation or to

Public Safety Exception: Confusing Confidentiality, Privilege and Ethics” (2001) 6 Can. Crim. L.
Rev. 217; and Wayne N. Renke, “Case Comment: Secrets and Lives — The Public Safety Exception to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (1999) 37 Alta. L. Rev. 1045.
20
Id., at paras. 36-43.
21
Id., at para. 85. Justice Cory viewed Solosky as implicitly based on the public safety exception to the privilege (paras. 56-57), even though this ground was not expressly articulated by
Dickson J. Importantly, Cory J. identified other recognized exceptions as including the right to
make full answer and defence to a criminal charge (innocence of the accused) (paras. 52-54) and
communications that are criminal in themselves (para. 55). He also stated that the class of possible
exceptions to the privilege is not closed and “may be expanded in the future, for example, to protect
national security” (para. 53).
22
Id., at para. 45.
23
Id., at para. 46.
24
Id., at para. 50.
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criminal charges.”25 He also stated that “the right to privacy in a solicitor-client
relationship is so fundamentally important that only a compelling public
interest may justify setting aside solicitor-client privilege.”26 Despite these
hortatory comments flirting with a constitutional basis for the privilege in both
the principles of fundamental justice and the right to privacy, Cory J. refrained
from expressly articulating such a basis.
Justice Major, in dissent, was less coy. He expressly recognized the
constitutional character of the privilege in the criminal context, saying this:
In the criminal context principles embodied in the rules of privilege have gained
constitutional protection by virtue of the enshrinement of the right to full answer
and defence, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination and the
presumption of innocence in ss. 7, 10(b), 11(c) and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms[.]27

Importantly, Major J. added that the constitutional principles underlying the
privilege would also inform its extension to other circumstances, such as to
communications with third party experts retained by counsel in preparing a
defence, and underscored the importance of categorical protection of the
privilege. He stated as follows:
Each of these rights support the extension of privilege to communications between
clients and experts retained by their counsel for the purpose of preparing a defence.
Together, they demonstrate the reasons for denying any use of solicitor-client
communications against an accused in any legal proceeding. To deny the protection
of solicitor-client privilege to the confidential communications of the accused to
those intimately involved in the preparation of his defence would frustrate these
rights. For these reasons, the communications between an accused and his counsel,
made in furtherance of his or her defence, are accorded the highest level of
protection and confidentiality.28

In short, for Major J. the Constitution itself provided a principled basis for
extending the privilege and determining its scope.
While Major J. accepted that a public safety exception should exist,
endorsing Cory J.’s “clear, serious and imminent” danger test for disclosure, he
concluded that any disclosure should exclude self-incriminating evidence. He
stated that failing to shield self-incriminating communications could have the
chilling effect of discouraging counsel from referring clients in need of
treatment to professionals for help. He said that “society will suffer by

25
26
27
28

Id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 74.
Id., at para. 7. Chief Justice Lamer and Binnie J. concurred with Major J.
Id., at para. 8.
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imposing a disincentive for patients and criminally accused persons to speak
frankly with counsel and medical experts retained on their behalf.” 29 In order to
address this concern, Major J. suggested that the scope of disclosure should be
as narrow as possible and guided by an accused’s right to consult counsel
without fear of assisting in his own prosecution. As he put it:
… solicitor-client privilege is a fundamental common law right of Canadians. That
right must be interpreted in light of the Charter which provides for the right of an
accused to counsel. Anytime such a fundamental right is eroded the principal [sic]
of minimal impairment must be observed.30

Accordingly, Major J. concluded that the psychiatrist should not be allowed
to disclose any communications from the accused relating to the circumstances
of the offence, but would be allowed to give his opinion and diagnosis of the
danger posed by the accused.31
3. Campbell and Shirose: Garden-variety Common Law Waiver
Less than a month after rendering Smith v. Jones, the Court released R. v.
Campbell and R. v. Shirose,32 dealing with the law of waiver of privilege. The
case involved a “reverse-sting” operation by the RCMP in which they posed as
drug dealers and sold a large quantity of hashish to senior personnel in a drug
trafficking organization. The purchasers were duly convicted of various drug
offences, but before sentencing sought to stay the proceedings on the basis of
police illegality, arguing that the “reverse-sting” was an abuse of process. The
Crown responded that the police had acted in good faith by relying on the legal
advice of the Department of Justice. Rather naturally, the accused then sought
disclosure of this legal advice to test the Crown’s allegations. The Crown
refused, invoking the RCMP’s solicitor-client privilege. The question for the
Supreme Court was whether the RCMP had waived its privilege by putting in
issue its state of mind, namely, its alleged good faith reliance on legal advice.
Justice Binnie for the Court rejected the view that merely by launching their
stay application the accused were entitled to disclosure under a “full answer
and defence” exception to the privilege. 33 He also accepted that, where a client
seeks legal advice to facilitate the commission of a crime, the established
29

Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 28.
31
Id., at para. 34.
32
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 (Campbell), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Shirose).
33
Id., at para. 65. Justice Binnie nevertheless left open the possibility that “in the absence of
waiver, full answer and defence considerations may themselves operate to compel the disclosure of
solicitor-client privilege of communications in an abuse of process proceeding” (para. 66).
30
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“future crimes and fraud” exception to the privilege potentially applies to
destroy the privilege.34 But Binnie J. did not need to resolve this issue, since he
found that the RCMP had waived any privilege by making a live issue of the
legal advice it had received from the Department of Justice. As a result, he
ordered the Department’s “bottom line advice” disclosed in order to “confirm
or otherwise the truth of what the courts were advised about the legal opinions
provided by the Department of Justice.” 35
It is curious that while Campbell and Shirose was released so soon after
Smith v. Jones, where the constitutionalization of the privilege was first
discussed, the Court chose not to engage in the brewing debate about whether
privilege was protected under the Charter. Indeed, in Campbell and Shirose
Binnie J. described solicitor-client privilege in rather prosaic terms, stating as
follows:
The solicitor-client privilege is based on the functional needs of the administration
of justice. The legal system, complicated as it is, call for professional expertise.
Access to justice is compromised where legal advice is unavailable.36

As we discuss further below, it is an open question whether the Court’s
discussion of waiver in Campbell and Shirose, on a garden-variety, common
law basis, survives the constitutionalization of the privilege, or whether a more
exacting standard for waiver should now be employed.

34

Id., at paras. 55-63. Interestingly, Binnie J. hinted (at para. 58) that the “future crimes” exception would also apply to a “future tort,” such that the privilege would be lost where the client
seeks legal advice for an activity the client knows is a crime or a tort (citing “The Future Crime or
Tort Exception to Communications Privileges” (1964) 77 Harv. L. Rev. 730, at 730-31). See also
Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), §14.58, at 737,
who agree that “[t]here is no reason why this exception [furtherance of unlawful conduct] to the
solicitor-client privilege should not also include those communications made with a view to perpetrating tortious conduct which may or may not become the subject of criminal proceedings” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). For a recent, expansive view of the “unlawful conduct”
exception to the privilege, see Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2815, at para.
16 (S.C.), per K.J. Smith J. (“‘unlawful conduct’ has a broader meaning than simply conduct that is
prohibited by criminal law. It includes breaches of regulatory statutes, breaches of contract, and
torts and other breaches of duty. Breaches of contract and civil duties are ‘unlawful’ because,
although they are not prohibited by any enactment, they cause injury to the legal rights of other
citizens and give rise to legal remedies. They are therefore contrary to law”).
35
Id., at paras. 73-74.
36
Id., at para. 49.
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4. McClure: The Privilege as a Principle of Fundamental Justice
Solicitor-client privilege crossed the Rubicon into constitutional territory in
R. v. McClure,37 which formally declared it to be a principle of fundamental
justice protected under section 7 of the Charter.
The central question before the Court was whether the privilege should yield
to an accused’s right to make full answer and defence to a criminal charge, and
if so, under what circumstances. This issue arose after McClure, a librarian and
schoolteacher, was charged with sexual offences against several former
students. After learning of his arrest, another former student retained a lawyer
and gave a statement to the police alleging various sexual offences by McClure,
resulting in more charges against him. This former student then commenced a
civil suit against both McClure and the school board. In the course of his
criminal case, McClure sought production of the student’s civil litigation file in
the suit against him. His stated purpose in seeking these materials was to
determine the nature of the allegations first made by the student to his solicitor
and to assess the extent of the student’s motive to fabricate or exaggerate the
incidents of abuse.38
Justice Major for the Court reiterated many of the traditional mantra
concerning the fundamental importance of solicitor-client privilege,39 tracing its
evolution from a rule of evidence to its status as a fundamental and substantive
rule of law.40 He noted that the privilege “commands a unique status within the
legal system,” one that “stretches beyond the parties and is integral to the
workings of the legal system itself.” Justice Major stressed the privilege’s
“distinctive status within the justice system,” stating that “[t]he solicitor-client
relationship is part of that system, not ancillary to it.” 41 Given this unique status
as a cornerstone of the justice system, Major J. confirmed that the privilege
must be as close to absolute as possible and may be waived only by the client. 42
The unique challenge posed by this case, Major J. noted, was how to
reconcile the almost-absolute privilege with the accused’s Charter right to make

37

Supra, note 1. For commentary, see David Layton, “R. v. McClure: The Privilege on the
Pea” (2001), 40 C.R. (5th) 19.
38
Id., at paras. 6-8.
39
Variously describing it as “fundamental to the justice system in Canada” and crucial to
“the integrity of the administration of justice” (Id., at para. 2), “integral to our system of justice” (at
para. 4).
40
Id., at paras. 17-25.
41
Id., at para. 31, citing Lamer C.J.’s comments in Gruenke, supra, note 16, at 289, that solicitor-client privilege is “essential to the effective operation of the legal system” and is “inextricably linked with the justice system.”
42
Id., at paras. 35, 37.
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full answer and defence. He stated the problem before the Court with beguiling
matter-of-factness in this way:
Solicitor-client privilege and the right to make full answer and defence are
principles of fundamental justice. The right of an accused to full answer and
defence is personal to him or her and engages the right to life, liberty, security of
the person and the right of the innocent not to be convicted. Solicitor-client
privilege while personal is also broader and is important to the administration of
justice as a whole. It exists whether or not there is the immediacy of a trial or of a
client seeking advice.
The importance of both of these rights means that neither can always prevail. In
some limited circumstances, the solicitor-client privilege may yield to allow an
accused to make full answer and defence. What are those circumstances? 43

Justice Major’s almost casual statement of the problem contains within it a
striking conclusion: solicitor-client privilege is now a principle of fundamental
justice, on a par with the Charter right to make full answer and defence, and
indeed, with all other Charter rights. Thus the privilege was constitutionalized,
entirely without fanfare, its obviousness hardly meriting commentary.
Having elevated the privilege into the rarefied atmosphere of constitutional
principle, Major J. went on to adopt a two-stage “innocence at stake” test,
allowing the privilege to be infringed “only where core issues going to the guilt
of the accused are involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful
conviction.”44 But Major J. cautioned that, before this test is even considered,
the accused must establish that the information sought in the solicitor-client file
is not available from any other source and he is otherwise unable to raise a
reasonable doubt about his guilt in any other way. Once this is shown, at the
first stage of the innocence at stake test the accused seeking production of a
solicitor-client communication must provide some evidentiary basis upon
which to conclude that there exists a communication that could raise a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.45 If the accused passes this first hurdle, Major
J. explained that the trial judge must then examine the solicitor-client file to
determine whether, in fact, there is a communication that is likely to raise a
reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.46
43

Id., at paras. 41-42 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 47.
45
Justice Major stated that, under stage 1, the trial judge must ask: “Is there some evidentiary basis for the claim that a solicitor-client communication exists that could raise a reasonable
doubt about the guilt of the accused?” (id., at para. 52).
46
Justice Major stated that, under stage 2, the trial judge must ask: “Is there something in the
solicitor-client communication that is likely to raise a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt?”
(id., at para. 57). He cautioned that simply providing evidence that advances ancillary attacks on the
44
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5. Brown: Some Refinements on McClure
A year after McClure, the Court confirmed the status of the privilege as a
principle of fundamental justice in R. v. Brown,47 which again considered when
solicitor-client privilege should yield to permit an accused to make full answer
and defence to a criminal charge. In this case, an accused charged with murder
sought to access another individual’s alleged confession to his lawyers that he,
rather than the accused, had committed the murder. The individual had
allegedly told his girlfriend of his confession, and she in turn had told the
police.
At first instance, the accused applied for and was granted an order
compelling disclosure of the files, documents and notes relating to the
individual’s communications with his lawyers concerning the alleged
confession to the murder. In the Supreme Court, Major J. for the majority ruled
that the disclosure order was premature, as the accused had neither shown that
the privileged information was unavailable from another source nor
demonstrated that the information was necessary to raise a reasonable doubt.
He also found that there were indications that any privilege had been waived
when the individual told his girlfriend about his confession to his lawyers, and
this issue should have been determined before any privilege was set aside. 48
Justice Major also stated that in those cases where an individual’s solicitorclient privilege is set aside because an accused’s innocence is at stake, the
privilege holder must be protected by the residual protection against selfincrimination contained in section 7 of the Charter. 49

Crown’s case, such as impugning the credibility of a Crown witness, or by providing evidence that
suggests that some Crown evidence was obtained unconstitutionally, will very seldom be sufficient
to meet this requirement.
47
2002 SCC 32, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 257. For commentary, see David Layton, “R. v. Brown:
Protecting Legal-Professional Privilege” (2002), 50 C.R. (5th) 37.
48
Id., at para. 5. Justice Major also provided guidance on the appropriate timing for bringing
a McClure application, stating that it is preferable to delay such an application until the end of the
Crown’s case as the Court would then be in a better position to assess the Crown’s case, and
determine whether the accused’s innocence is in fact at stake (para. 52). He also stated that a
McClure application is not a “one shot” affair, and may be brought at different times during the trial
if defence counsel believes that an accused’s innocence is at stake (at para. 54).
49
Id., at para. 94. As Major J. explained, the privilege-holder is not an accused, and so cannot claim the right not to testify against himself under s. 11(c) of the Charter, and may not be a
witness able to claim the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by s. 13 of the Charter (at
para. 90). As a result, the broader principles of fundamental justice and the residual protection
against self-incrimination under s. 7 would potentially apply (at para. 90).
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In the course of his ruling, Major J. confirmed the new constitutional footing
for the privilege, stating that it is a “fundamental tenet of our legal system,”50
and “fundamental to Canada’s justice system and will yield only in rare
circumstances.”51 But as in McClure, he found that where the privilege and
innocence clash, the privilege must yield as minimally as necessary to permit
the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 52 As Major J. put it in
Brown:
While it is impossible to place either right higher on a hierarchy […] Canadians’
abhorrence at the possibility of a faulty conviction tips the balance slightly in
favour of innocence at stake over solicitor-client privilege.53

While a balancing of rights is a commonplace in the law, what is important
here is that this is a constitutional balance, with the privilege on one side and
innocence (full answer and defence) on the other.
6. Lavallee: The Privilege Protected by the Right to Privacy
The privilege passed another important constitutional milestone in Lavallee,
Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v.
Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, where the Court accepted that the
privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter as part of a client’s
fundamental right to privacy. 54 Lavallee is particularly important because it is
the first time the privilege has been used to strike down legislation: in this case,
section 488.1 of the Criminal Code, which set out the procedure for
determining a claim of solicitor-client privilege over documents seized from a
lawyer’s office under a warrant.
In essence, section 488.1 required material seized under a search warrant
from a lawyer’s office to be sealed at the time of the search, permitted the
solicitor to apply within strict time limits for a determination that the material
was privileged, and with the court’s permission permitted the Crown to
50
Id., at para. 89. See also para. 1 (the privilege and the right to make full answer and defence are “[b]oth fundamental tenets of our justice system”) and para. 95 (reiterating “the fundamental importance of solicitor-client privilege to our system of justice”).
51
Id., at para. 47.
52
Id., at para. 81.
53
Id., at para. 2.
54
Supra, note 2. Justice Arbour (McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie
JJ. concurring) delivered reasons for the majority. Justice LeBel (L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.
concurring) dissented in the result, though he accepted that the privilege is protected under s. 8 of
the Charter and agreed with the majority that s. 488.1(4) was unconstitutional (para. 84). See also
Hamish Stewart, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice and s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code” (2001)
45 Crim. L.Q. 232.
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examine the seized material to assist in determining whether the material was
privileged.
Justice Arbour for the majority traced the historical development of the
privilege from a rule of evidence to a substantive principle to a principle of
fundamental justice. She noted that the privilege acquires an additional
dimension in the criminal context, where the individual faces the state and is
entitled to the full protection of the privilege. 55 Fundamental justice provides
that any information protected by the privilege is out of reach of the state,
unless the client consents. As she put it:
It is critical to emphasize here that all information protected by the solicitor-client
is out of reach for the state. It cannot be forcibly discovered or disclosed and it is
inadmissible in court. It is the privilege of the client and the lawyer acts as a
gatekeeper, ethically bound to protect the privileged information that belongs to his
or her client. Therefore, any privileged information acquired by the state without
the consent of the privilege holder is information that the state is not entitled to as a
rule of fundamental justice.56

Justice Arbour also found that a client has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in privileged information in the possession of his or her lawyer,
declaring this to be an expectation of privacy of the highest order protected
under section 8 of the Charter. She stated as follows:
A client has a reasonable expectation of privacy in all documents in the possession
of his or her lawyer, which constitute information that the lawyer is ethically
required to keep confidential, and an expectation of privacy of the highest order
when such documents are protected by the solicitor-client privilege.57

Thus, the privilege was now protected under both sections 7 and 8 of the
Charter. While both provisions were invoked to challenge section 488.1,
Arbour J. relied exclusively on section 8, reasoning that if the legislation
resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to section 8, it would
also violate the principles of fundamental justice under section 7. 58
While traditional section 8 analysis requires the court to balance the needs of
law enforcement with an individual’s privacy interests, 59 Arbour J. found this
55

Id., at para. 23: “in the context of a criminal investigation, the privilege acquires an additional dimension. The individual privilege holder is facing the state as a ‘singular antagonist’ and
for that reason requires an arsenal of constitutionally guaranteed rights […] It is particularly when a
person is the target of a criminal investigation that the need for the full protection of the privilege is
activated.”
56
Id., at para. 24.
57
Id., at para. 35. See also at para. 21.
58
Id., at para. 35.
59
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159-60, per Dickson J. (as he then was).
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analysis to be inappropriate where solicitor-client privilege is at stake. She
stated that “the privilege favours not only the privacy interests of the potential
accused, but also the interests of a fair, just and efficient law enforcement
process. In other words, the privilege, properly understood, is a positive feature
of law enforcement, not an impediment to it.” 60 Justice Arbour therefore
adopted a modified section 8 approach imposing more stringent norms to
protect a client’s privacy interests. Under this approach, which Arbour J. found
was supported by the Court’s prior jurisprudence, any legislation interfering
with solicitor-client privilege “more than is absolutely necessary” would violate
section 8.61
Justice Arbour found that section 488.1 more than minimally impaired the
privilege. She found that the fatal feature of the legislation was that it allowed
for the potential breach of the privilege without the client’s knowledge or
consent, as a result of absence or inaction of the solicitor in asserting the
privilege on behalf of the client following the seizure. The privilege could thus
be breached without the client’s express and informed authorization, and
indeed, even without the client having an opportunity to be heard. 62 She stated
that the legislation shifted onto counsel the burden of ensuring protection of the
constitutionally guaranteed privilege, entirely failing to address directly the
rights of the privilege holder to ensure adequate protection of his or her rights.
Since the right of the state to access this information is, in law, conditional on
the consent of the privilege holder, Arbour J. found that all efforts to notify that
person (or possibly an appropriate surrogate such as the Law Society) must be
in place in order for the legislation to conform with section 8 of the Charter.63
Justice Arbour identified another fatal flaw in the legislation as being the
absence of judicial discretion to prohibit the Crown’s entitlement to the seized
material where no claim of privilege is asserted within the timelines under the
legislation. She stated that “reasonableness dictates that courts must retain a
discretion to decide whether materials seized in a lawyer’s office should remain
inaccessible to the state as privileged information.” 64 She also found another
unjustifiable impairment of the privilege in the court’s discretion to permit the
Attorney General to inspect the seized documents to assist the court assessing
the claim of privilege. She found that any benefit from having the Attorney
General doing so was greatly outweighed by the risk of disclosing privileged
information to the state in the conduct of a criminal investigation.65
60
61
62
63
64
65

Supra, note 2, at para. 36.
Id.
Id., at para. 39.
Id., at paras. 40-42.
Id., at para. 43.
Id., at para. 44.
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Having found that section 488.1 more than minimally impaired the privilege
contrary to section 8 of the Charter, Arbour J. observed that the Crown had not
sought to justify the infringement under section 1. In any event, she noted that
it would be “difficult to conceive” how such an infringement could survive the
minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test.66 In our view, this is perhaps an
understatement. By definition, legislation that violates section 8 for failing to
minimally impair the privilege cannot be said to minimally impair the privilege
under section 1. Thus, it would seem that any violation of solicitor-client
privilege under the Court’s modified section 8 framework will fail section 1 as
well.
With respect to remedy, Arbour J. stated that the question of seizure of
materials from a lawyer’s office raised several procedural options that were
best left to Parliament to consider. She therefore struck down section 488.1,
rather than employing remedial techniques such as severance or reading in. In
the interim, however, Arbour J. set out 10 general principles to govern law
office searches until Parliament decides, if it sees fit, to re-enact legislation on
this issue.
Justice Arbour concluded by summarizing the status and role of the privilege
to the administration of justice in these terms:
Solicitor-client privilege is a rule of evidence, an important civil and legal right and
a principle of fundamental justice in Canadian law. While the public has an interest
in effective criminal investigation, it has no less an interest in maintaining the
integrity of the solicitor-client relationship. Confidential communications to a
lawyer represent an important exercise of the right to privacy, and they are central
to the administration of justice in an adversarial system. Unjustified, or even
accidental infringements of the privilege erode the public’s confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system. This is why all efforts must be made to
protect such confidences.67

Justice LeBel dissented.68 He agreed with Arbour J.’s conclusion that the
legislation violated section 8 for allowing the Attorney General to view the
privileged material to assist the court in assessing a claim of privilege — and
thus accepted that the privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter, a
point on which the Court was therefore unanimous. However, LeBel J.
disagreed with the other constitutional shortcomings Arbour J. had identified.
Most importantly, in his view the legislation had to be interpreted having regard
to a lawyer’s ethical obligation to protect a client’s privilege, and in this light
provided sufficient protection for the privilege. Any other conclusion, in LeBel
66
67
68

Id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 49.
L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. concurred with LeBel J.
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J.’s view, would result in “[a] finding of unconstitutionality based on the
assumption that lawyers will not perform their duties with diligence and
competence.”69 It would, he stated, “require Parliament to build safeguards into
criminal legislation itself against negligence, inattention, slowness in action and
sloppiness in management and organization.” 70
An important implication of the Court’s unanimous finding that solicitorclient privilege is protected under section 8 of the Charter is that the privilege
has finally been recognized as a rule of property. Early cases had eschewed
describing the privilege as a rule of property in finding that the privilege was
only a rule of evidence, and so operated only where privileged communications
were sought to be introduced into evidence in a legal proceeding. 71 But
including the privilege as a component of informational privacy under section 8
means that the privilege is indeed now a rule of property. In prior section 8
cases, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that informational privacy “derives
from the assumption that all information about a person is in a fundamental
way his own, for him to communicate or retain […] as he sees fit.” 72 Similarly,
the privilege expresses the client’s fundamental right to privacy over his or her
information, namely, the client’s confidential communications with his or her
lawyer. Privileged information is therefore in a fundamental way the property
of the client, for him or her to communicate or retain as he or she sees fit.
7. Things to Come: Maranda — Is There Privilege Over Lawyers’ Fees?
The Supreme Court considered yet another privilege case in May 2003,
when it heard argument in Maranda v. Corporal Normand Leblanc, on appeal
from the Quebec Court of Appeal.73 Maranda concerns another challenge to a
search against a lawyer’s office under section 488.1 of the Criminal Code,
though in this case there was no challenge to section 488.1 itself. The Court of
Appeal’s ruling was released before the Supreme Court had rendered Lavallee.
An important question will therefore be how Lavallee impacts on this case.
Maranda raised three principal questions.

69

Id., at para. 63.
Id., at para. 64.
71
See, e.g., R. v. Colvin, ex parte Merrick (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 8, at 13 (Ont. H.C.), per
Osler J. (“the rule is a rule of evidence, not a rule of property”), discussed by Arbour J. in Lavallee,
supra, note 2, at para. 12.
72
R. v. Law, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 16, per Bastarache J.; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 417, at 429, per La Forest J.
73
Leave to appeal granted May 16, 2002. The Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision is reported
as R. v. Charron (2001), 161 C.C.C. (3d) 64.
70
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First, should a warrant be quashed where the search and seizure was not
limited to items that could solely be obtained on the premises of the law office?
Proulx J.A. for the Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative,
finding that while it would be preferable to restrict a search and seizure of a
lawyer’s office to what is strictly necessary, this is not an absolute requirement.
In this case, Proulx J.A. found there was a link between the documents that
could only be found at the lawyer’s premises and other documents, and so the
whole of the search was permitted.74
Since section 488.1 of the Criminal Code is no longer of any force or effect
as a result of Lavallee, one can expect that the seizure itself should be found to
have been unauthorized by law. But it could also be asked whether Proulx
J.A.’s decision measures up to the principles established by Arbour J. for a
warrant against a lawyer’s office. In our view, it does not. In particular, Proulx
J.A.’s ruling fails to meet the second and third principles identified by Arbour
J., namely, the requirements that the issuing justice must be satisfied that there
exists “no other reasonable alternative to the search,” coupled with the
requirement that the issuing justice “must be rigorously demanding so as to
afford maximum protection of solicitor-client confidentiality.”75 In our view,
respect for these principles requires that the warrant be limited strictly to
information that is unavailable elsewhere than at the lawyer’s office.
Second, is the presence of the client’s lawyer required when executing the
warrant, or is it sufficient to require a representative of the Bar to attend?
Proulx J.A. found that the latter would suffice, since this would ensure that a
claim of privilege would be asserted, resulting in the automatic sealing of the
seized documents. He found that this procedure went well beyond what was
provided for in section 488.1.76 Again, in our view this conclusion fails to
measure up to the standards imposed in Lavallee. Justice Arbour stated that the
first line of protection for the client’s privilege is the client and his or her
lawyer. She found that only if they cannot be contacted should a Bar
representative be permitted to oversee the sealing and seizure of the
documents.77
Finally, does the amount of a lawyer’s fees and disbursements constitute a
privileged communication? This information was sought in this case because
the accused, who was charged with drug trafficking, had reported income in the
74

Id., at para. 25.
Supra, note 2, at para. 49.
76
Supra, note 73, at paras. 37-42.
77
Supra, note 2, at para. 49: “Every effort must be made to contact the lawyer and the client
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(emphasis added).
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tens of thousands of dollars, yet had assets in the millions of dollars. It was
hoped this evidence would show that the accused was in possession of the
proceeds of crime. Justice Proulx ruled that a lawyer’s fees and disbursements
are not per se privileged. He said that much depends on the context. Justice
Proulx found that the fact of payment is not inherently a client communication,
though the narrative portion of the bill of account could well be privileged, as it
could disclose the nature and substance of the privileged communication. 78 In
our view, this conclusion is clearly correct. In the civil context, bills of account
are routinely disclosed to the court in seeking costs. While the narrative portion
of the account is often excised or edited in order to protect privilege, the
quantum of payment itself would rarely be considered to be a privileged
communication. There are nevertheless circumstances where even the fact of
retainer, and thus the bill of account itself, could be privileged, such as where a
client retains a lawyer on a confidential basis. 79 In our view, therefore, Proulx
J.A.’s rejection of a per se rule in favour of a contextual approach is consistent
with the Court’s ruling in Lavallee.80

III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Lately the status of solicitor-client privilege as a constitutional principle
protected under the Charter has been much discussed in assessing the
constraints this imposes on state action. This issue has arisen in the
constitutional challenges to the federal government’s recent money-laundering
legislation, which tried to impose reporting obligations on lawyers when
confronted with suspicious financial transactions by their clients, 81 as well as in
the Law Society of Upper Canada’s proposed new rule of professional conduct
dealing with a lawyer’s obligations when confronted with property relevant to a
crime or offence.82 These are important and difficult issues, but they are not our

78

Supra, note 73, at paras. 80, 84, 94-95.
This is similar to circumstances where the name of a client may itself be privileged: see
Lavallee, supra, note 2, at para. 28.
80
Justice Proulx also concluded, in the alternative, that the bills were not privileged under
the crimes exception (supra, note 73, at paras. 101-107). In our view, this is also likely correct,
given the Court’s ruling in Campbell and Shirose, supra, note 32.
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Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17. On
March 25, 2003, the federal government announced that it is now exempting lawyers from the
reporting obligations under the Act. See “Major Victory Scored by Bar Against Money Laundering
Law,” The Lawyers Weekly (April 4, 2003), at 1.
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See Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Committee on Lawyers’ Duties with Respect to
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focus. Instead, we consider some less-discussed implications from the Supreme
Court’s recent rulings, focussing on: (a) whether the privilege’s new status as a
constitutional principle will have any impact on the civil bar; (b) whether there
is any scope for a full answer and defence exception to the privilege in the civil
context; (c) whether the constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege is
likely to extend to litigation privilege; and (d) whether the rules of waiver of
privilege will need to be reconsidered having regard to the ordinarily high
threshold for waiver of a constitutional right.
1. The Constitutional Principles in the Civil Context
Each of the recent cases considering solicitor-client privilege as a
constitutional principle has arisen in the criminal context. The question
naturally arises whether this status will have any significant implications for the
civil bar. The exceptional public safety and innocence at stake grounds for
setting aside privilege have little immediate relevance, one might think, to the
more pedestrian circumstances in which the privilege arises in the civil
context.83
But a narrow reading of the recent cases as limited to the criminal context
would in our view be mistaken. To begin with, while both McClure and Brown
were criminal cases, in neither case was production of privileged information
sought by the state. In both cases it was sought by a private party against
another private party. Most tellingly, in McClure the privilege-holder whose
privilege was weighed against McClure’s right to make full answer and defence
was not an accused in a criminal case, but was rather a civil litigant who
claimed damages against McClure and the school board for sexually assaulting
him, and what was sought was production of his civil litigation file. The
Supreme Court held that the privilege over the civil file was protected by the
principles of fundamental justice. As a result, it is clear that the constitutionally
protected privilege can relate to communications in a civil suit. Similarly, in
Brown the privilege-holder who had allegedly confessed to the crime to his
lawyers and to his girlfriend was not the accused, and production was sought
not by the state but by the accused, a private party. Lastly, in Lavallee Arbour J.
justified the constitutional character of the privilege as based on its “central role
to the administration of justice in an adversarial system.” 84 Given that the
83
These include claims of privilege in affidavits of documents, to resist production of expert
reports, and claims of waiver, whether voluntary, inadvertently or by implication. See, for example,
W. Augustus Richardson “The Privilege Against Production: Are the Walls of Jericho Falling?”
(1986), 10 C.P.C. (2d) 294; E. Dolden, “Waiver of Privilege: The Triumph of Candour Over
Confidentiality” (1990), 36 C.P.C. (2d) 56.
84
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privilege has a correspondingly central role in the civil process which similarly
forms part of the adversarial system, one would expect the same rationale to
extend to the status of the privilege in the civil context.
In short, privileged communications are protected by the principles of
fundamental justice under the Charter (or the values therein) even if they are
made in a civil suit, and even if sought by a private party rather than the state.
These conclusions raise further questions concerning the source of the state
action required to engage the Charter, and whether they involve departure from
the established rules that the Charter does not apply directly either to the
common law85 or to court orders.86 In our view, no state action is required: a
constitutionalized privilege principle in the civil context can be rationalized
under the Supreme Court’s well-established doctrine that the common law must
be developed in accordance with Charter values. 87 As Professor Hogg has
noted:
… the exclusion of the common law from Charter review is not particularly
significant. When the Charter does not apply directly, it will apply indirectly, and,
despite some differences in the way s. 1 justification is assessed, the indirect
application is much the same as in its effect as the direct application.88

Indeed, Major J.’s dissenting reasons in Smith v. Jones had expressly
invoked Charter values in finding that any infringement of the privilege in the
name of public safety would have to respect the privilege holder’s right to
counsel and the principle of minimal impairment.89
Thus, the constitutional character of the privilege must be considered even in
civil litigation. The privilege is a principle of fundamental justice and part of
the fundamental right to privacy. Where the state seeks disclosure of privileged
communications, the Charter applies directly to protect against disclosure.
Where disclosure is sought by a private party, the privilege applies at common
law, appropriately fortified by Charter values under sections 7 and 8.

85

R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 603, per McIntyre J.; R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Beverages (West) Ltd., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 156, at paras.
18-20, per McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J.
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Dolphin Delivery, id., at 598-600, per McIntyre J.
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Pepsi-Cola Beverages (West) Ltd., supra, note 85, at paras. 18-20, per McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel J.; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at paras. 96-98, per Cory
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Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed., vol. 2, at 34-24 (updated to 2002).
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2. A “Full Answer and Defence” Exception to the Privilege in the Civil
Context
As an exclusionary rule of evidence, solicitor-client privilege excludes from
the court’s consideration privileged information even though it may be highly
relevant, probative and trustworthy. This exclusion is justified by the overriding
societal interest in protecting the confidential relationship between solicitor and
client.90 McClure established an exception to this, permitting truth-finding
(avoiding a wrongful conviction) to trump the privilege where an accused’s
innocence is at stake. Since innocence cannot be at stake in the civil context,
one wonders whether truth-finding in civil cases can ever trump the privilege.
In our view, there is a reasonable basis to believe that it can: a McClure-like
exception may exist even in the civil context. Support for this view comes,
most recently, from the Court’s 2002 ruling in Sierra Club of Canada v.
Canada (Minister of Finance),91 which held that the right to make full answer
and defence operates as a constitutional value in the civil context in the form of
a civil litigant’s right to present its case and its right to a fair trial.
Sierra Club brought into question the circumstances in which a court should
grant a confidentiality order in the civil context, in this case, to protect
confidential documents of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited relating to an
ongoing environmental assessment by Chinese authorities of the sites for two
CANDU nuclear reactors purchased by China. AECL sought to rely on the
documents to defend against allegations that the federal government had
breached the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 92 by providing financial
assistance to China for the sale of the reactors without undergoing an
environmental assessment. The Court found that a restricted confidentiality
order permitting only the court, the parties and their counsel to see the
confidential documents struck the right balance between the constitutional
principle of open courts and AECL’s need to protect its commercial interests.
In balancing the rights and interests of the parties, Iacobucci J. for the Court
considered AECL’s commercial interests, but also gave great weight to its right
to make “full answer and defence” to the allegations in the case, which he
equated to its right “to present its case” and to its “right to a fair trial.” He

90
Gruenke, supra, note 16, at 286, per Lamer C.J.; M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at
para. 19, per McLachlin J. (as she then was); John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W.
Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), at §14.1, at 713 (“the exclusionary rule of
privilege […] is based on social values, external to the trial process. Although such evidence is
relevant, probative and trustworthy, and would thus advance the just resolution of disputes, it is
excluded because of overriding social interests”) (footnotes omitted).
91
2002 SCC 41, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
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stated that while this is not a Charter right, it is nevertheless a “fundamental
principle of justice.” As Iacobucci J. put it:
As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the
information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences
available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the
appellant’s capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more
generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense,
preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis
infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this
does not engage a Charter right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as
a fundamental principle of justice: M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para.
84, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair
trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest
in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in
the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the
judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in
having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.93

Thus, in the civil context, full answer and defence operates as a fundamental
principle of justice, guaranteeing a civil litigant’s right to present its case and
its right to a fair trial. This is exactly the same as the constitutional principle
that the Court in McClure said could trump solicitor-client privilege in some
(albeit rare) cases. In principle, one would therefore expect a similar McClurelike rule to operate in the civil context. The circumstances where privilege
would yield might well be even rarer in the civil context, where liberty is not in
issue. But if McClure is founded on the subordination of the privilege to truthfinding in some cases, then surely the same subordination should hold true in
the civil context in “some cases.”
Further support for this view can be found in M. (A.) v. Ryan,94 which
involved disclosure of therapeutic counselling records in a civil suit brought by
a patient against her former psychiatrist who had sexually assaulted her. While
in Sierra Club Iacobucci J. had cited from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting
reasons in Ryan, the majority reasons of McLachlin J. (as she then was) support
the view that the right to make full answer and defence may trump a privilege
in a civil case, though she cautioned that the disclosure threshold may be higher
in a civil than in a criminal case. McLachlin J. said this:
Just as justice requires that the accused in a criminal case be permitted to answer
the Crown’s case, so justice requires that a defendant in a civil suit be permitted to
answer the plaintiff’s case. In deciding whether he or she is entitled to production

93
94

(2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at para. 50 (emphasis added).
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 157.
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of confidential documents, this requirement must be balanced against the privacy
interest of the complainant. This said, the interest in disclosure of a defendant in a
civil suit may be less compelling than the parallel interest of an accused charged
with a crime. The defendant in a civil suit stands to lose money and repute; the
accused in a criminal proceeding stands to lose his or her very liberty. As a
consequence, the balance between the interest in disclosure and the complainant’s
interest in privacy may be struck at a different level in the civil and criminal case;
documents produced in a criminal case may not always be producible in a civil
case, where the privacy interest of the complainant may more easily outweigh the
defendant’s interest in production.95

The above framework for a full answer and defence exception to the
privilege in the civil context moved from the theoretical to the practical in the
Federal Court, Trial Division’s recent decision in Baltruweit v. Canada
(Attorney General).96 In that case, Gibson J. relied on the full answer and
defence exception developed in the criminal context to require the Canadian
Human Rights Commission to disclose to a complainant the substance of a
legal opinion it had relied on in refusing to refer a complaint of discrimination
to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The Court noted that “while what is at
issue here is not full answer and defence to a criminal charge, it is not without
parallel features: it is the opportunity for the applicant to make full answer in a
context where his allegation of infringement of his fundamental human rights
might be […] irrevocably determined against him.” 97
Thus, it seems clear that some form of full answer and defence exception to
the privilege will apply in the civil context. The scope of this exception remains
to be determined by future cases. The challenge will be to keep it tightly
constrained, as disclosure of relevant evidence can often be justified by the
need to make full answer and defence or the right of a litigant to present its
case. A broadly applied exception risks emasculating the privilege and
undermining its constitutional status, rendering its constitutionalization a
pyrrhic victory indeed.

95
Id., at para. 36. See also Lac d’Amiante du Québec v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc., [2001] 2
S.C.R. 743, per LeBel J., holding that Quebec law recognizes an implied rule of confidentiality at
an examination for discovery (similar to the deemed undertaking rule at common law). In the
course of his reasons, LeBel J. stated that “in an area such as the public nature of trials, the fundamental constitutional principles in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also come into
play where applicable in a private judicial proceeding” (at para. 40).
96
[2002] F.C.J. No. 1615 (T.D.), per Gibson J.
97
Id., at para. 32.
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3. Application to Litigation (Work Product) Privilege
Another important issue that is likely to land in the courts before long is
whether the constitutionalization of the privilege extends from solicitor-client
(or legal advice) privilege to litigation privilege, that is, the privilege over
materials and information created with the dominant purpose of preparing for
litigation.
While the fundamental differences between the solicitor-client and litigation
privilege have received appellate scrutiny of late, 98 one of the clearest
explanations of these differences remains Sharpe J.A.’s article “Claiming
Privilege in the Discovery Process,” written prior to his judicial appointment,
where he explained as follows:
It is crucially important to distinguish litigation privilege from solicitor-client
privilege. There are, I suggest, at least three important differences between the two.
First, solicitor-client privilege applies only to confidential communications between
the client and his solicitor. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies to
communications of a non-confidential nature between the solicitor and third parties
and even includes material of a non-communicative nature. Secondly, solicitorclient privilege exists any time a client seeks legal advice from his solicitor whether
or not litigation is involved. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies only in
the context of litigation itself. Thirdly, and most important, the rationale for
solicitor-client privilege is very different from that which underlies litigation
privilege. This difference merits close attention. The interest which underlies the
protection accorded communications between a client and a solicitor from
disclosure is the interest of all citizens to have full and ready access to legal advice.
If an individual cannot confide in a solicitor knowing that what is said will not be
revealed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for that individual to obtain proper
candid legal advice.
Litigation privilege, on the other hand, is geared directly to the process of litigation.
Its purpose is not explained adequately by the protection afforded lawyer-client
communications deemed necessary to allow clients to obtain legal advice, the
interest protected by solicitor-client privilege. Its purpose is more particularly
related to the needs of the adversarial trial process. Litigation privilege is based
upon the need for a protected area to facilitate investigation and preparation of a
case for trial by the adversarial advocate. In other words, litigation privilege aims to
facilitate a process (namely, the adversary process), while solicitor-client privilege

98
See, e.g., General Accident Assurance Company v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 321
(C.A.); Gower v. Tolko Manitoba Inc. (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 716 (Man. C.A.); and College of
Physicians of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner),
[2003] 2 W.W.R. 279 (B.C.C.A.).
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aims to protect a relationship (namely, the confidential relationship between a
lawyer and a client).99

Particularly significant for present purposes is the role of confidentiality in
solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege: confidentiality of the
communication is essential for the former but not for the latter. 100 This raises
the issue of whether litigation privilege can be justified under or embodied in
the principles of section 8 of the Charter, as protected by the client’s
constitutional right to privacy. In our view, litigation privilege is also protected
by section 8 or the values therein, but the justification is slightly different. The
privacy right engaged is not the right to privacy over a confidential
communication between lawyer and client, but rather the right to privacy over
the lawyer’s brief or work-product, the need for a zone of privacy for the
lawyer’s trial preparation as a fundamental part of the adversary process. 101
This is still the client’s privacy right, exercised by the client’s agent — the
advocate — and like the solicitor-client privilege can be waived only by the
client. But its purpose is to facilitate the litigation process rather than to protect
the client’s confidential relationship with his or her lawyer.
The role of litigation privilege as a cornerstone of the adversary process also
provides its justification as a principle of fundamental justice. The lawyer’s
protected zone of privacy is essential for trial preparation and a basic tenet of

99

R.J. Sharpe, “Claiming Privilege in the Discovery Process” in Law in Transition: Evidence, L.S.U.C. Special Lectures (1984) 163, at 164-65. Litigation privilege is less frequently
invoked in criminal than in civil litigation, perhaps because the accused in a criminal case has no
disclosure obligation to the Crown. Nevertheless, litigation privilege is increasingly being invoked
by the Crown in criminal proceedings to limit disclosure to the defence: see Ian Carter, “Chipping
Away at Stinchcombe: the Expanding Privilege Exception to Disclosure” (2002), 50 C.R. (5th) 332,
discussing recent case law recognizing a work product privilege for both the Crown and the police.
100
See Gary D. Watson and Frank Au, “Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege in
Civil Litigation” (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 315.
101
It is instructive that the litigation privilege is often justified by reference to the need for a
lawyer’s zone of privacy in trial preparation: see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, at 510-11
(1947) (“it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by the opposing parties and their counsel”); R.J. Sharpe, “Claiming Privilege in the
Discovery Process” in Law in Transition: Evidence, L.S.U.C. Special Lectures (1984) 163, at 16465 (“there is a need for a zone of privacy to facilitate adversarial preparation”); General Accident
Assurance Company v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 321, at 331 (C.A.), per Carthy J.A.; College of
Physicians of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner),
[2003] 2 W.W.R. 279, at para. 30 (B.C.C.A.), per Levine J.A. (“[l]itigation privilege is […] geared
towards assuring counsel a ‘zone of privacy’ and protecting the lawyer’s brief from being poached
by his or her adversary”); John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The Law of
Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), §§14.75-14.76, at 745-47.
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the adversary process. It therefore qualifies as a principle of fundamental
justice under section 7 of the Charter. 102
Support for this view can be found in Major J.’s dissenting reasons in Smith
v. Jones. Justice Major articulated the constitutional principles underlying
solicitor-client privilege and then suggested that these principles “support the
extension of privilege to communications between clients and experts retained
by their counsel for the purpose of preparing a defence.”103 Justice Major later
confirmed that the privilege should be extended to communications for the
purpose of trial preparation, seemingly bringing litigation privilege within the
scope of the constitutional principle he had articulated. He stated as follows:
To deny the protection of solicitor-client privilege to the confidential
communications of the accused to those intimately involved in the preparation of
his defence would frustrate these rights. For these reasons, the communications
between an accused and his counsel, made in furtherance of his or her defence, are
accorded the highest level of confidentiality.104

While these comments do refer to the confidentiality of communications
between lawyer and client, the repeated references to defence preparation
suggest that Major J. viewed this feature as equally important, such that
litigation privilege is also constitutionally protected or at least informed by
these constitutional values. Indeed, at least one appellate judge has accepted
this reading of Major J.’s reasons. 105
Thus, in our view it will not be long before the reasons underlying the
constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege under sections 7 and 8 of the
Charter are extended to constitutionalize litigation privilege as well.
4. Constitutionalization of Waiver of Privilege
Just as the law of solicitor-client privilege has been constitutionalized, so
too, in our view, has the law of waiver of privilege. If, as is clear, the privilege
102
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 512-13, per
Lamer J. (as he then was); R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 28, per LeBel J.
103
Smith v. Jones, supra, note 19, at para. 8 (emphasis added).
104
Id. (emphasis added).
105
General Accident Assurance Company v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 321, at 355 (C.A.),
per Doherty J.A., dissenting in the result, noting that “[w]hile Major J. spoke in terms of clientsolicitor privilege, he in fact limited his observations to circumstances in which litigation privilege
would apply.” Justice Doherty went on to say that “[i]t is unclear whether Major J. used the phrase
‘solicitor-client’ privilege […] in a way that conflates client-solicitor privilege with litigation
privilege […] there is considerable confusion with respect to terminology in this area of the law.”
We are grateful to Adam Dodek for bringing this passage from Doherty J.A.’s reasons to our
attention.
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has become a constitutional right (or Charter value), then questions of waiver of
privilege are now questions about waiver of constitutional rights. As such, the
law of waiver of privilege is informed by the Court’s jurisprudence on the very
high threshold required for waiver of constitutionally guaranteed Charter rights.
(a) The Standard for Waiver of a Charter Right
The Court will find a Charter right is waived only if the waiver is “clear and
unequivocal,” and made with full knowledge of the rights waived and the effect
that waiver will have on those rights. 106 Professor Don Stuart has noted that
“[w]hen the Supreme Court has characterized the issue as one of waiver, it has
repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to find that there has been a waiver of a
Charter right.”107 Thus, one would similarly expect the Court to strain to avoid a
finding of waiver when what is at issue is waiver of the fundamental right to
solicitor-client privilege.
Currently, questions of waiver of privilege are not consistently approached
on this basis. However, it can be expected that the constitutionalization of the
privilege will have the effect of making it that much harder to establish waiver
in particular cases. In both civil and criminal cases, disputes over waiver of
privilege often involve inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials or waiver
by implication (i.e., by conduct). Historically the law in this area has been
murky and has long presented a trap for the unwary. The constitutionalization
of privilege offers the hope of greater clarity in this area of the law, through a
re-examination of the traditional doctrines in light of constitutional principles.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure
The traditional position at common law used to be that accidental disclosure
resulted in a permanent destruction of the privilege. 108 This position was
gradually repudiated by Canadian courts, which accepted that inadvertent

106

See, e.g., Clarkson v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, at 394, per Wilson J. (waiver of the
right to counsel); R. v. Lee, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384, at 1411, per Wilson J. (waiver of the right to jury
trial); R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 790, per Sopinka J. (waiver of delay under the right to be
tried within a reasonable time in s. 11(b)).
107
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (2001), at 26.
108
Calcraft v. Guest, [1898] 1 Q.B. 759 (C.A.) (while originals of inadvertently disclosed
privileged documents may remain privileged, copies made from the originals are not privileged and
may be introduced into evidence); see John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The
Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), at §§14.115-14.116, at 764.
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disclosure would not waive privilege.109 But some courts have held that even
where privileged information is inadvertently disclosed, such that
confidentiality is lost, it may be possible to introduce that information into
evidence if what is being sought to be proved from the information is important
to the outcome of the case and there is no reasonable alternative form of
evidence that can serve that purpose.110
A constitutionalized waiver doctrine would clearly reject inadvertent
disclosure as sufficing to destroy the privilege. Inadvertent disclosure would
not overcome the “clear and unequivocal” standard established by the Supreme
Court in other contexts. Indeed, Arbour J.’s observation in Lavallee that even
“accidental” infringements of the privilege would “erode the public’s
confidence in the administration of justice” 111 should signal that accidental
waiver will effectively cease to exist under Canadian law.
But the further question of whether accidentally disclosed privileged
information can ever be introduced in court, if important to the outcome of the
case and there is no reasonable alternative form of evidence that can serve the
same purpose, remains very much alive. This exception would apply both in the
criminal and the civil contexts. In criminal cases, the operative test would be
the highly demanding McClure “innocence at stake” approach. In the civil
context, if there is indeed a full answer and defence exception to the privilege,
then the standard for introducing this evidence would similarly be modified to
take account of the privilege’s constitutional character, to insist that the
privileged information is “essential” to make full answer and defence, such as
by preserving the right to a fair trial. This is a higher standard than one of mere
“importance” to the outcome of the case. The infringement of the privilege
should also meet the minimal impairment test, such that the privileged
information is unavailable from any other source. This is similarly a standard
higher than one that insists only on no “reasonable” alternatives.
(c) Waiver by Implication
Similar considerations would apply to the doctrine of waiver of privilege by
implication. Waiver by implication occurs where, in the absence of an express
intention to waive the privilege, a party is taken to have done so by its conduct,
such as where that party has taken positions which would make it inconsistent
109
See, e.g., Elliott v. Toronto (City) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 472, at para. 10 (Sup. Ct.), per
Ground J.; John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in
Canada, 2nd ed. (1999), at §§14.121-14.122, at 766-67.
110
See, e.g., Metcalfe v. Metcalfe (2001), 198 D.L.R. (4th) 318, at para. 28 (Man. C.A.), per
Helper J.A.
111
Supra, note 2, at paras. 25, 49.
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to maintain the privilege.112 The test used to rationalize the implied waiver
cases has typically been “fairness,”113 in that it is viewed as being “unfair” to
permit one party to take certain positions and then to invoke privilege when the
other party seeks information in order to respond.
Campbell and Shirose, discussed above, is a recent example of waiver by
implication. There it will be recalled that the Court held that the RCMP had put
in issue the Attorney General’s legal advice by alleging good faith reliance on
that advice in defence to an abuse of process motion claiming police illegality.
Justice Binnie found that the RCMP had put in issue its state of mind, and so
the defence was entitled to get to the bottom of the legal advice the RCMP had
received.
It will be recalled that Binnie J. did not rely upon constitutional
considerations in discussing either the privilege or the circumstances in which it
is waived. It is in this sense that it was referred to as a “garden-variety” waiver
case. But it is open to question whether Binnie J.’s approach would meet the
more exacting standards of a constitutionalized waiver doctrine. Could it be
said that the RCMP had “clearly and unequivocally” waived its privilege, and
done so with full knowledge of the rights it waived and the effect that waiver
would have on those rights? Surely at most the Court held that disclosure of the
Department of Justice’s opinion should be ordered because the RCMP had
impliedly waived privilege by putting in issue its state of mind. The Court did
not go so far as to make any findings as to the RCMP’s actual knowledge of its
rights, or as to its actual knowledge of the effect of waiver on those rights.
Put another way, implied waiver provides a constructive knowledge standard
for waiver. Waiver is deemed or implied as a matter of fairness given positions
taken by the privilege holder. By contrast, constitutional waiver insists upon a
subjective knowledge standard for waiver. Waiver is found only if the privilege
holder is shown to have clearly and unequivocally waived its rights, with full
knowledge of the rights waived and the consequences that this would have on
those rights.
Given the differences in these standards, the common law of implied waiver
of solicitor-client privilege will probably have to be re-examined and brought in
line with the requirements of the Charter. In sum, the constitutional character of
the privilege will likely raise the bar on when it can be taken as having been
waived. Waiver should be found in only the clearest cases, where a party can be
shown to have been aware of its rights and have had full knowledge of the

112

John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman and Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada,
2nd ed. (1999), at §§14.100-14.112, at 758-63.
113
Id.
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consequences of waiving them. In our view, the vaguer “fairness” test will
likely not provide a sufficiently precise constitutional standard.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent constitutionalization of solicitor-client privilege
marks a watershed in the privilege’s long history. The Court’s rulings are
obviously vastly important in themselves, but they are just as or more important
for what they portend. Every lawyer confronted with questions of privilege —
and every lawyer is — must now have a firm grip on the law of the Charter.
Anything less risks compromising the now even more fundamental relationship
between lawyer and client.
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